Europe Has the Science. Asia Has the Capital. The Missing Layer Is Execution

with Károly Szántó and Thijmen Meijer

When I sat down with Thijmen Meijer and Károly Szántó, I wanted to have a very specific conversation.

Not about hype. Not about “more funding.” Not about another innovation conference.

I wanted to talk about the real reason so many European startups, especially university spin-offs from Central and Eastern Europe, never reach visibility, never reach the right partners, and never reach exits.

And I wanted to put a spotlight on the other side of the equation.

In Asia, there is capital. A lot of it.

In Europe, there is science. A lot of it.

They rarely meet in a way that produces scalable outcomes. So we went straight to the root cause. Execution.

The gap is real. And it starts earlier than most founders think.

Károly shared a statistic that stuck with me. Around 22 percent of European university spin-offs are funded by venture capital. That means the majority never even become venture fundable.

In Central and Eastern Europe, that number is likely even lower. This is not because the ideas are weak. It is because the translation from research to market is broken. And if you fix what is missing, Europe can outperform. That was one of the most important points in our discussion.

Because where there is a gap, there is an opportunity. But only if you are willing to build the missing layer.

Europe is building. But often not for the market.

One of the most direct moments in the conversation was when we talked about what the market actually needs.

In our region, we develop a lot of things that are interesting. Not useless, but not needed. That difference matters.

In academia, incentives are clear: publications, impact factors, citations, and recognition.

In the market, incentives are different: outcomes, adoption, reimbursement logic, and execution.

If you do not translate early, you build something impressive that still cannot scale.

Thijmen framed it well. The gap is not only spinning something out of a university. The real gap is getting from proof of concept to a proper entity with a defined go-to-market.

That step is where most teams stall.

Central and Eastern Europe has a cultural drag. And it shows up as a mindset.

Károly brought up something that many people avoid saying out loud. Mindset is a bottleneck.

There is a cultural heritage in parts of Eastern Europe that is closer to waiting than building. Waiting for somebody else to make things happen. Waiting for permission. Waiting for funding.

And inside the academic bubble, it becomes even stronger. Because the KPIs are not commercialization KPIs. Then we asked the obvious question.

Can this mindset be changed?

The answer is not romantic. It can be changed, but not overnight. And not with motivational talks. It changes through structure, role clarity, and accountability. And that is exactly why our approach starts with the team.

Most founders do not need more money first. They need team design.

This is where the conversation got very practical.

Thijmen pointed to a pattern we see constantly. Some founders truly want to bring something to the market, but they do not have the competence to get it from zero to one. And they often believe they can do it alone.

Then the second issue shows up.

They do not want somebody “above” them.

This is where I jumped in, because I have seen it too many times.

Great scientists and founders are often not great CEOs. Not because they are not smart. Because it is a different job.

When I advise founders, I often recommend a shift that feels emotionally difficult.

Bring in a CEO. Let the founder become Chief Medical Officer, or Chief Technology Officer. That is not a step back. That is role optimization.

If you want the company to win, you put each person where they are strongest.

In Central Europe, this problem is bigger because we did not learn this model historically. But the market does not care about our history. The market cares about results.

Execution is not a vague concept. It is due diligence, gap mapping, and milestone discipline.

Károly explained how they approach startups through a structured diligence process.

It starts with personality analysis and internal motivation. Not as a soft exercise, but because execution risk is often human risk.

Then it moves to the team level: how these people work together, what is missing, and where the gaps are.

A gap is normal. Not knowing about it is dangerous.

Then comes a part that I consider one of the biggest silent killers in biotech and medtech.

Milestones.

Most teams have milestones that sound reasonable. Very few can define them with crystal clarity. And that matters because sooner or later, you report to investors, partners, and the market. If your milestone is open to interpretation, you will create conflict later.

Károly said something I agree with completely. It is better to invest the time at the beginning to avoid debates and arguments later. That is what execution discipline looks like. It is not glamorous. It is winning.

The funding environment is not the core problem. It is the filter.

I asked them directly about the investment side.

Founders complain that they could build quickly if they had enough funding. But in the last one or two years, the market has changed. Money is not “free” anymore. Investors are putting larger tickets into fewer companies. The number of invested deals is down, even if the total capital deployed does not look dramatically lower.

So, early-stage spin-offs feel further away from capital. But Thijmen and Károly both came back to the same point. Better plans and clearer milestones improve fundability significantly. Not foolproof, but a higher chance. And Károly added a point that every founder should understand.

Investors decide fast. Not the full investment. The first decision.

They decide quickly if they want to spend more time with you. Then diligence follows.

Without preparation, many startups fail in the first five minutes. That is brutal. And it is true.

So founders need a compelling story in minute one, two, and three. Not a story designed to “convince.” A story designed around value creation and return. That is the only story that survives.

Founders are often miseducated by investors.

This part of the conversation mattered to me because it explains founder behavior that looks irrational until you understand the trauma behind it.

Some investors teach founders, directly or indirectly, that the only acceptable conversation is about IRR, ticket size, and exit.

So founders learn to hide the real operational topics: clinical testing, regulatory plans, execution constraints, and infrastructure. They think investors do not want to hear it.

Then they meet a partner who actually cares about execution, and the founder starts by talking only about money.

Károly described it as a kind of PTSD. I have seen the same. So part of the work is to reset the conversation.

We are not here to be impressed by your deck.

We are here to help you build something that can survive reality.

Two questions that change the conversation fast

Károly shared a framework I like because it forces clarity without theatrics.

First question:

What would you do if you had all the resources? Money is no issue.

In Eastern Europe, it is not always easy to get people to dream big. But once they do, it becomes exciting.

Then the second question:

What could we achieve from this big dream that does not require money?

That is where the clarity shows up. Because many of the most valuable next steps cost focus, not funding. And the moment founders see that, they stop using capital as an excuse and start acting like operators.

That is when real valuation begins.

Impact matters. Not as charity. As a filter.

I asked them about impact because in healthcare, impact is not a marketing line. It is the reason we exist.

We are not building companies only for IPO stories. We are not building companies to end up in the trash after an exit because the product never mattered.

I said it in the discussion, and I will say it again here. There is not enough money in the world to sponsor everything. We have to build more efficient models. Not just for returns, but for real outcomes.

Thijmen said it clearly. That is why we are in deep tech. Not another B2B CRM. Károly went deeper. Life is too short to work without true impact.

We want to make money. No shame in that. But we want to create value first. Money is one expression of value. And I agree with this. In healthcare, if you do not create impact, you will not create durable returns.

Asia has a capital. But much of it does not understand the risk profile.

This is where my own experience in Asia matters.

Asia has a lot of capital, but a lot of it comes from sectors like real estate. It is not specialized in life sciences capital. So when I say “dumb money,” I am not insulting anyone. I am describing a mismatch.

If you do not understand why biotech timelines are seven or eight years, why failure rates are high, and how risk mitigation works, you cannot price risk correctly. And if you cannot price risk, you cannot be a good partner in deep tech.

What is interesting is that I often see universities and government agencies in Asia understanding deep tech more than some private VCs. They build lab space, programs, and infrastructure. They create access.

This matters because it shows the market is learning. But it also shows why Europe and Asia keep missing each other.

Capital is present. Science is present. Execution alignment is missing.

Lab space matters. But ownership is a trap. Partnership is leverage.

Thijmen asked about lab space, and I agreed that there is a strong correlation between access to lab infrastructure and startup quality, especially in Central and Eastern Europe.

When you lack basic equipment, you lose years. That is not a theory. I lived it. I saw researchers waiting for access to machines, and time kills competitiveness. But I also shared something personal.

I made the mistake of over-investing in infrastructure earlier in my journey. During COVID, I almost lost everything. That lesson was expensive.

Now I operate differently.

You do not need to own infrastructure to win. You need access. You need a partnership. You need flexibility. And if you build the right network, you can solve constraints that look impossible locally.

I recently connected three companies across three continents that would never have met. In a few days, they saved years of development simply by sharing context and capabilities.

That is what execution leverage looks like.

The hidden global barrier: confidence and culture

Károly described something I have also observed.

Central European teams can be brilliant. They can be confident at home.

Then you take them to a meeting in the UK, Scandinavia, or the US, and the room changes them. They become quiet. They hide behind you. They assume they are less relevant.

This is not about intelligence. It is about cultural calibration. And it is exactly why we cannot wait until the go-to-market moment to solve it.

If a startup needs to go global in 2027, you cannot hire the global operator in 2027. You need time to blend culture and build execution readiness. This takes planning, and it takes an ecosystem.

What we are building is the missing layer

In the podcast, I said we need to change the old model because it is not working.

Efficiency is more important than before. AI is accelerating everything. Capital markets are more selective. Deep tech timelines are not getting shorter by themselves. So the only way forward is to build models that de-risk and accelerate execution.

That is why I believe in a hybrid approach. Clinical validation and infrastructure, combined with investment discipline. Human and team risk mitigation, combined with milestone clarity. Partnership networks, combined with operator-led execution.

This is not a theory. This is how you close the gap between science and capital.

Closing

Europe has the science. Asia has the capital. The missing layer is execution.

If you are a founder and you feel invisible, this is why.

If you are an investor and you are tired of science projects that burn capital, this is why.

If you are a partner who wants real impact, this is where you should focus.

Execution is not a talent issue. It is a design issue. And when you build the execution layer properly, the visibility problem stops being a mystery. Because the market does not reward potential. The market rewards delivery.

Timecode:

00:00 Introduction and Meeting the Guests

00:16 Challenges Faced by European Startups

04:44 The Importance of Mindset in Commercialization

07:43 Building Effective Teams for Startups

14:04 Investment Challenges and Opportunities

17:15 The Role of Clear Goals and Milestones

21:40 The Investor's Perspective

25:26 Introduction to Portfolio Companies

25:45 The Need for New Investment Models

26:05 Technological Boom and Efficiency

26:29 Building Companies for Impact

27:30 Challenges in Deep Tech Investment

27:50 Value-Driven Founders

29:12 Operational Models and Risk Mitigation

30:50 Identifying Good Partners

32:55 Scaling Up and Future Goals

33:43 Investor and Founder Dynamics

37:09 Cultural Differences in Startups

46:40 Lab Space and Resource Challenges

49:39 Networking and Collaboration

51:57 Preparing for Global Markets

Links:

Peter M. Kovacs LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/petermkovacs/

Peter M. Kovacs Personal Website:https://www.petermkovacs.com/

PMK Group Website: https://www.pmk-group.com/

Guests:

Károly Szántó: https://www.karolyszanto.com/

Thijmen Meijer: https://www.thijmenmeijer.com/

UniPrisma: https://uniprisma.com/

Transcript:

Peter M Kovacs: So nice to meet you here, guys. Karoly, very nice to meet you here again, and Thijmen, very nice to meet you again after our recent podcast. I'm very happy that you accepted this invitation and I'm very happy to discuss with you about the gaps at startup companies. They are suffering because, within Europe, there are a lot of talented startups and entrepreneurs, but they never reach the visibility and the exit level.

In Asia, there is a lot of capital, but they still never meet. I would like to find the main root cause why this is happening, but more importantly, I would like to discuss today how we can help these companies. UniPrisma Venture Studio and PMK Group, as a clinical validation and investment firm—how can we really support and change this old-fashioned model to make it a bit more effective?

So starting at the very beginning: why is it so difficult for a startup company to reach this visibility level where they can attract investors or any partners—not even investors, just any collaboration partners? What do you see based on your experience over the past few decades? Why is it so difficult? If I'm an entrepreneur with a very good idea—it could be a Nobel Prize or a unicorn company—why is that happening to me? Why can I not reach any of these two?

Károly Szántó: Thanks for the invitation, first of all. Good to be back with you. Maybe today we can recap on our partnership and what we have achieved so far. Answering your question, we just lately learned about some statistics which show that only 22% of European university spinoffs are funded by venture capital, which means the rest don't even reach the level of becoming venture capital fundable or investment-ready. There's a huge gap, and when you think about it, it's also a huge opportunity. If you fix what's missing, then Europe can really outperform many other regions.

Peter M Kovacs: But I can expect this 22% to have a huge imbalance between Western Europe, Northern countries, and Central Eastern Europe. Currently, we are focusing our collaboration on Central European countries and startups coming from these countries. I guess that this 22% is even much lower in these regions.

Thijmen Meijer: Indeed. And also what Karoly said, this 22% is really about getting from a proof of concept into a proper entity and defining the go-to-market strategy—not just how to spin it off from the university, but also how to get it ready for the commercial markets. I think that's also where the key difference is.

Károly Szántó: The other aspect is that we are talking about signals from the market and trying to understand the patterns of what's happening. One very strong signal is that the European Union has assembled, or is in the motion of assembling, a 500 million euro fund for the growth stage of deep tech companies. Most deep tech companies originate from a university. The problem is on a system level. Central and Eastern Europe is behind the average, and all efforts are focused on the ability to commercialize. We have outstanding research in Europe, even in Central and Eastern Europe—great researchers, great scientists, great universities—but somehow they don't find the way to commercialize.

Peter M Kovacs: So we are developing a lot of things which are not completely useless, but aren't really what the market needs. It’s more interesting than useful.

Károly Szántó: Exactly. There are several components to this problem, but my favorite topic is the mindset. We have a cultural heritage in Eastern Europe of waiting for somebody else to make things happen. When you are in the academic bubble, it happens even more strongly because the KPIs and incentives on the research part are publications—very different KPIs than in the market.

Whereas in the US, or in some of the universities that are doing a good job in spinoffs like Cambridge, Oxford, or Munich, they have a pattern and a playbook on how to commercialize, and they have a huge advantage in terms of culture. The base value from where you start to convince a researcher that they need to commercialize is on a much lower level here. For us, we have to assess the team first. It's usually not so much around the skills first, but more on the mindset: are you open? Are you ready to make money from your work?

Peter M Kovacs: Thijmen, you are very strong in the HR field. Is it possible to change this mindset? Is it age-dependent?

Thijmen Meijer: The mindset is first, indeed. There's a different kind of mindset in Europe than in the US, for instance, and definitely different in Central Eastern Europe, where commercialization is almost a dirty word in the research world. Especially in healthcare, they would rather have a publication in Nature than bring it to the market. Then there is the other way around: founders who are keen to bring it to the market but don't have the skillset or competence. They feel they can do it by themselves, but they don't have the ability to take it from zero to one. This is also a mindset issue on a different note: they don't want to have somebody above them. We see that certain founders need a CEO on top of them, not the other way around.

Peter M Kovacs: I recommend many times that great scientists and founders are not necessarily good CEOs because it's a completely different mindset and knowledge set. Usually, we ask them not to step back—it’s not a step back—but to change roles. This gives the possibility for a business-oriented person to become CEO, and the founder becomes the CMO (Chief Medical Officer) or CTO. They do what they are best at, and the CEO brings success to the market.

It's a very common problem everywhere, but maybe in Central Europe, it’s even bigger. Based on our history, we didn't have the chance to learn how to do it yet. But as you mentioned, it's a big opportunity for our collaboration because there are so many good talents. We cannot help everybody, but hopefully, we can find good examples. Could you explain in more detail what the steps are from the beginning? When you find a talented person or a good asset, how do you plan to build them up?

Thijmen Meijer: It should start with the proof of concept and how the patent or IP rights are held within the company. Is it with the university, the founder, or the researcher? What kind of rights does the university have? This makes it investible from a commercial perspective as well. Then afterwards, we need to see the key competencies within the core team and where the gap is. We need to get to know each other to understand the skills within the team. As we saw with one startup last week, they already sensed a gap, but it was not clearly described. With our tools and expertise, we really brought it to the surface.

Peter M Kovacs: Is this evaluation part of your due diligence process or just an initial evaluation to see if it’s a go/no-go?

Károly Szántó: It's part of the due diligence and it has building blocks. One building block is personality analysis. Once that's done, we see how these different characters and people work together. Where is the gap? There is always a gap; it's okay to have one, but it's not okay to not know about it. Basically, what we are doing is identifying risks and then mitigating them with an action plan.

On the team side, we look at internal motivation and personality types. Then we take a deep look at the business plan. What are the milestones, and if they are reached, where does it lead us? Is there a clear North Star? Is it measurable in time and quality? Our goal is to help the team and the investor have the right framework and narrative to create a very clear, concise story so that we all speak the same language.

In my experience, most teams have some kind of KPIs or milestones, but very few can define them crystal clear. It is a very dangerous thing because once they are there, they will write a report proudly presenting to the investor that they reached Milestone 3. But when you dig into it, you see they only met the goals partially. It's a matter of definition. It's better to invest the time at the beginning to avoid such debates later. One thing we are doing is helping—and at the same time, pressuring—the team to have these goals clearly defined.

Thijmen Meijer: I cannot say it better.

Peter M Kovacs: How do you see the investment part? Many founders complain they could reach exit potential easily if they got enough funding, but I don't really think so. In the last year or two, times have been more difficult for startups. Investment volume hasn't necessarily decreased, but the number of companies invested in is much lower. This means bigger ticket sizes going to a smaller group of companies.

University spinoffs and small startups at lower levels have become further away from accessing venture capitalists. Most were relying on research grants which are shrinking year to year, especially in Central Eastern Europe as EU funding reached certain economy levels. Is the lack of access to investment the main reason they cannot move forward, or is it just a part of it?

Thijmen Meijer: I think it's what we already said: having a proper team and knowing your gaps, especially on the roadmap to the North Star. Investors are looking for "smart money" and professional partners who know exactly how to utilize the funds, not just a bulk load of money with a high burn rate and hoping for the best. Money is not free anymore. We believe that with a proper plan and a roadmap that is crystal clear on a granular level, that is the way to go.

Károly Szántó: Adding to that, most founders—and this relates to the commercializing bottleneck—are not aware of what really matters for an investor and for the market. Discussion often starts by asking them to throw everything they think is valuable on the table, and then we help them sort out the values that actually matter. That is often surprising for them. It’s a delicate discussion because we don't want to offend them, but I always say it’s better if you get offended with me than to have a harsh discussion and failure with an investor.

There are two questions, seemingly contradictory, that we apply to help them get out of their mindset bubble. One question that does wonders is: "What would you do if you had all the resources? Money is no issue. What's the best way to go about it?" It's actually not easy in Eastern Europe to get people to dream big; you need to nudge them. But once they get there, they draw a big dream on the table.

Then comes the next question: "What could we achieve out of this big dream which doesn't require money?" Then comes clarity. They discover that many of those things they want to achieve that are valuable for the market don't really cost money. They discover clarity and have to be flexible to twist the story around. It creates traction, which creates value, and company valuation goes up.

Peter M Kovacs: If the company, with our help, realizes and solves these gaps together with the founders, they have a much better chance to get access to funding?

Thijmen Meijer: By knowing yourself, you definitely know where the gaps are. When you know the team, you can do an organizational design later and get a much better understanding of where you are. Maybe you don't need an extra marketing hire because you already have that talent internally.

Peter M Kovacs: So you feel that when you solve these gaps, you build a stronger team with a clear vision, making it easier to get access to funding?

Thijmen Meijer: Absolutely. It’s not foolproof, but it’s a significantly higher chance.

Károly Szántó: One thing: I spent a decade in venture capital and sat on the side where startups were pitching me. One of my guilty pleasures is to ask other investors how fast they actually decide if they want to invest. Most experienced investors make decisions very quickly—the "gut feeling" decision, which is always followed by thorough due diligence to double-check that intuition. But without our preparation, many startups would fail in the first five minutes. You need to be concise and focused to have a compelling story within the first three minutes; otherwise, you don't get the second five minutes.

It's not very difficult to convince an investor if your goal is not to convince the investor. The good goal is to be very focused on how you actually create value and return. If you have a good story on that, you don't need to convince anybody. In our culture, when I read startup news, I rarely read success stories like reaching 2 million euros in ARR; what you read is "we got investment."

Peter M Kovacs: Which shouldn't be the news at all.

Károly Szántó: Exactly. The main news should be that we made a huge impact or improved the lives of millions.

Thijmen Meijer: And just to add to that: what you are mostly investing in is deep tech. Biotech and medtech founders are not typical B2B SaaS guys. They are really good at the research and the science, but not so much at preparing for investors.

Peter M Kovacs: I hope we can prove this is a good opportunity. We started with two portfolio companies and are increasing this number quickly. I always thought about disruptive models because the current conservative investment model is not working. Efficiency is more important than before; there is not enough money in the world to sponsor all companies. We should find the more efficient way of investment—investment is just the last piece. We are not developing companies just for an IPO or an exit only to have the company end up in the trash. It’s important to select companies that make a human impact, especially in healthcare. Do you focus on social impact when listening to a pitch?

Thijmen Meijer: That's why we are in biotech and medtech—not another B2B CRM. We are keen to thrive in this market where deep tech in Europe is undervalued.

Károly Szántó: I think all three of us feel that life is too short to work without true impact. When you are doing something value-driven, it comes across. We want to make money—it's not a charity—but we want to do it by creating value. Peter, your model as a clinical researcher offering infrastructure, validation, and a clinical roadmap together with investment is an execution-centered model mitigating risk. Our joint value proposition is very strong and pragmatic.

Peter M Kovacs: If someone is only focused on the ticket size and doesn't care about the partnering, I already know it's not a good fit. It will be the first and last discussion. There is a lot of "dumb money" in Asia coming from real estate, but medtech and biotech are so sophisticated. If someone doesn't understand why the failure rate is high or why it takes eight years, we cannot explain risk mitigation to them. I see clearly in Asian markets that the majority don't understand; they focus on simpler investments. But governmental agencies and big universities often understand even more than private VCs or angel investors.

We need clear oversight because our time and resources are limited. Our target is about 30 startup companies in the next few years. I think this is a feasible and lucky group.

Károly Szántó: In all fairness, some founders have bad experiences with investors. We met a startup where they only talked about money at first, but when we kept asking, it turned out they had a much more valuable story to tell. They had to learn that we aren't just about ticket sizes. Investors who don't add value have miseducated the founder community to only talk about IRR and exit timelines. They learn to keep research and regulatory topics for internal discussions so they don't "bore" the investor. We need to help them release those right topics.

Thijmen Meijer: I love when investors say, "If a founder cannot do the sales themselves, I don't invest," which basically eliminates all university spinoffs. We like to address that. If the researcher cannot do sales, we can find the finance guy, the marketing guy, and the salesperson to put next to them.

Károly Szántó: Talking about that, where do you actually find those people? In the US, it’s easy to identify "entrepreneurs in residence"—an exited entrepreneur who knows the way. In Central and Eastern Europe, good luck with that. That’s when our network kicks in. We need to actively scout for people in broader Europe who have been there and done that. The best VCs build a community of co-investors, academic partners, and corporate partners.

It takes time and face time to build that trust. Our long-term goal should be this. We need to identify entrepreneurs who are currently running a great medtech startup and are a few years away from an exit. We need to build rapport now before they are bored and looking for the next gig.

Peter M Kovacs: How do you see the potential of Central European startups compared to the US or Asia? Most big minds arrive in the US from Europe; European science has the most Nobel Prizes and best results. But the ecosystem is not working efficiently. Asian markets are coming up quickly with a lot of money, but they are newborns in this field and still learning to use it. US has almost everything but lacks good talent. How can we connect startups here to pick the benefits from Asia and the US?

Károly Szántó: In Asia, the work ethic is on a whole new level—the service level and responsibility for speed and quality is something we can't even grasp. In the US, commercialization capability is next to none. Europe’s strength is a creative mindset, tackling problems in unusual ways. We need to learn from the work ethics of Asia and the commercialization of the US. You don't have time to pick up this culture in a year while running a startup.

The realistic scenario is to scout for partners and entrepreneurs to merge that culture into the team. If you put a startup from Budapest into Boston or Seoul without support, they will suffer because of the culture gap. In the US, you need to be 100 times braver. In Asia, you need to up your game in delivering quality service.

Thijmen Meijer: Regarding mindset, you cannot change a nation or a continent. We cannot have that born-competitive edge the US has. But I read an article about the connection between biotech startups and lab space. They could see that more lab space results in more high-quality startups. What do you think about that?

Peter M Kovacs: In Central Eastern Europe, there is a very significant correlation. Lack of resources is strong in preclinical and laboratory science. I studied at a medical university and worked with science universities in Hungary, and I saw them waiting years just to buy a machine to measure something. Even if you have a patent, you lose years of time.

In Singapore, the government builds huge laboratory buildings and provides them to startups for free or at a low price. This shows that lab access is vital for early-stage startups. However, I made the mistake in my previous experience of spending too much money on infrastructure and I lost everything during COVID. I realized it’s an expensive lesson: you don't need to own it. I can collaborate with different stakeholders much more effectively and spend much less money. If you don't have lab space, you have to find another solution for risk mitigation.

Károly Szántó: What happens with a Hungarian startup after the first two years of TR 3-5? When they reach 6-7, I like to ask them: "Are you prepared to live in another country if needed?" It's better to know in advance. Many confident teams from this region lose their confidence when I take them to Scandinavia or the UK for investor meetings. They become shy and talk through me. There is a lot to do in terms of strengthening their narrative and building up confidence before they move out. We need to hire entrepreneurs early enough—at least a year before going to market—to mix the culture and build the narrative so they are efficient when the time comes.